Los Angeles Times journalist Robin Wright

DATE November 26, 2002 ACCOUNT NUMBER N/A
TIME 12:00 Noon-1:00 PM AUDIENCE N/A
NETWORK NPR
PROGRAM Fresh Air

Interview: Robin Wright discusses her visit to northern Iraq and
Iran and what the current political mood in the region is
TERRY GROSS, host:

This is FRESH AIR. I'm Terry Gross.

Although much of the Gulf region opposes American intervention in Iraq, the
Kurds in northern Iraq are hoping the Americans will succeed in ending the
regime of Saddam Hussein. And their troops, known as the peshmerga, want to
play a leading role in getting him out.

My guest, journalist Robin Wright, spent two weeks in Kurdistan this month,
where she interviewed the leaders of the two Kurd factions. She also spent a
week in Iran. We're going to talk with her about her observations of both
places. Wright is the chief diplomatic correspondent of the Los Angeles
Times. She's reported from over 130 countries for CBS News, The Washington
Post and the Sunday Times of London. She's covered nine wars and reported for
five years from the Middle East. She's also the author of "Sacred Rage: The
Wrath of Militant Islam."

The Kurds are the largest ethnic group without their own state. They have
autonomy in Kurdistan, northern Iraq, where they are protected by US and
British planes that patrol the no-fly zone. I asked Robin Wright what kind of
help the US is hoping for from the Kurds.

Ms. ROBIN WRIGHT (Chief Diplomatic Correspondent, Los Angeles Times): Well,
the United States actually faces a dilemma. The peshmerga forces in northern
Kurdistan are the only troops that might be used like the Northern Alliance
was in Afghanistan. But the Turks are very nervous about this and, of course,
Turkey is the friendliest border for the United States as it looks at where it
could launch an invasion. There's virtually no other country on Iraq's
perimeter that really wants the United States or would even tolerate the
United States using their turf to launch a military assault.

GROSS: Why is Turkey afraid of that? What would it mean for Turkey?

Ms. WRIGHT: Turkey has its own Kurdish problem. In fact, it's the single
largest security issue inside Turkey. And there's deep fear that if Iraq's
Kurds actually gain control of an area in the north, legally, and has access
to Iraq's oil wells in the north, that it would create a very strong Kurdish
entity that could, in fact, help Kurds elsewhere perhaps get their autonomy
inside Turkey or neighboring Syria and Iran, where there are also strong
Kurdish populations, or somewhere down the road, even fight for a greater
Kurdistan.

Now I don't think that's going to happen. I think something very interesting
has happened inside Iraq over the past decade. The Kurds have recognized that
there are limitations to the state they have created, or the statelet they've
created. And the majority of Kurdish leaders I talked to were very adamant
about recognizing that their future now lies not with Kurds in neighboring
countries, but actually in Baghdad. They really talk quite genuinely today
about creating a post-Saddam regime that includes Shiite Muslims in Iraq's
south, Sunni Muslims in the center of Iraq and Kurds in the north together.
Now they do want a great deal of autonomy, but they want it in context of
Iraq.

GROSS: So they don't want to secede from Iraq.

Ms. WRIGHT: The Kurds today don't want to secede from Iraq. I had one of
the Kurdish leaders explain to me that the future of the world is
globalization, not the creation of new mini-states that are not functional,
that can't compete economically or politically.

GROSS: Now there are two factions in the Kurds in northern Iraq. You spoke
with the leaders of each of those factions. What is the split between them
about?

Ms. WRIGHT: The two dominant groups in the north are the Patriotic Union of
Kurdistan, led by Jalal Talabani, and the Kurdish Democratic Party, led by
Massoud Barzani. The two men are long-standing rivals, and in the mid-1990s
actually fought a mini-civil war in the north. Tragically, it was not over
ideology, but actually over issues like splitting revenues from the taxation
of smugglers moving in and out of their territory, which had been one of their
primary sources of income, as well as control of land. In 1998, the United
States mediated a resolution of this conflict, and began a process of
confidence-building measures.

What's really made the timing of the Kurdish issue so interesting is that
after years, or decades even, of tension and rivalry, they reopened their
joint national assembly just last month, and the two of them are in France
this week to talk together with European authorities about the future of Iraq.
And both of them talk, I think quite genuinely today, about recognizing that
their future in Iraq will depend on their own unity, and that the Kurdish
people will be the first to suffer if the rivalry is allowed to continue.

GROSS: You interviewed Massoud Barzani, one of the leaders of the Kurds in
northern Iraq. His father was also a Kurdish leader. Who was his father?

Ms. WRIGHT: Mustafa Barzani launched the Kurdish nationalist movement in the
1960s and launched the peshmerga, the fighting force that has been a bane to
Saddam Hussein through the '60s, '70s and '80s. He was the one who mediated
the first deal with the United States to get involved in Kurdistan against
Saddam Hussein and his cronies in power. Unfortunately, the United States in
1975 abruptly ended its support of the Kurds in negotiating a deal between
Iran and Iraq, and tens of thousands of Kurds died when Saddam Hussein, then
vice president of Iraq, launched an offensive that put the Kurds down. He
subsequently died in exile.

The movement was inherited by his son, Massoud Barzani, and the Barzani clan
is one of the most powerful and wealthy in northern Iraq. And Barzani is
today a representative of the kind of tribal power that still exists in
northern Kurdistan, and he is quite noteworthy as a symbol of the Kurds
because he still wears the baggy pants and the tightly-wound turban of the
Kurds.

GROSS: How much does that memory of American betrayal from 1975 linger in the
mind of Massoud Barzani now? Does he distrust the United States because of
the way they turned against the Kurds in 1975 when his father was the leader?

Ms. WRIGHT: The Kurds, in general, are very suspicious of US involvement in
Iraq because of repeated betrayal by the United States, not only in 1975. In
1991, then-President George Herbert Walker Bush called for an uprising by the
Kurds against Saddam Hussein after the Gulf War ended. The Kurds did just
that, but the United States allowed Saddam Hussein to use his helicopter
gunships, and the subsequent military assault on the north led more than a
million Kurds to flee to the borders with Iran and Turkey. And the Kurds feel
that they were really betrayed, that they did what the United States asked and
the United States allowed them to be beaten again at the cost of thousands of
Kurdish lives.

I think both Kurdish leaders believe that the United States is its only
potential friend, but there is still deep suspicion. And as a result, they're
asking for guarantees, specifically that the United States will act militarily
if Saddam Hussein should move against the north again as he did in 1996 in a
kind of pre-emptive strike perhaps to throw the world off course, doing
something that would surprise and disrupt the kind of pattern that everyone
foresees unfolding over the next few weeks and months over the weapons
inspections.

GROSS: The Kurds have been able to have their own statelet, as you call it,
in northern Iraq because that area has been patrolled by the United States and
England. It's a no-fly zone, and they prevent Iraqi planes from flying there
and attacking the Kurds. So how much loyalty do the Kurds have to the United
States and England because of their patrol of that no-fly zone?

Ms. WRIGHT: Kurdistan now thrives as a little statelet in part because of the
no-fly zone by Britain and the United States, but it owes even more to the
United Nations for the oil for food program, which was launched in 1996 and
now allows Kurds for the first time in their history, really, to get a large
or proportionate share of Iraq's oil revenues. Under oil for food, all of
Saddam Hussein's oil revenues are channeled through the United Nations back
into the country. And so the Kurds have a source of income, which they've
used very cleverly to build schools, universities, health centers, to pave
roads, to reforest the northern area, to promote agriculture in the richest
agricultural area of the country.

It has flourished in ways that are, in many ways, unimaginable in other parts
of the Arab world and even the Islamic world. It's allowed them to open up
society so that there are Internet cafes everywhere and satellite dishes that
perch atop, you know, mud-brick roofs in the countryside and dangle with
laundry off little balconies in apartment blocks in the cities. They've
brought in the outside world, and they've created access for Kurds in exchange
to communicate with the outside world even though there's no postal system in
the country.

So the United Nations and the US have played a critical role, but the Kurds
really deserve an awful lot of credit for rebuilding themselves. Saddam
Hussein pulled out his administration in 1991 in large part to starve the
Kurds. He thought that living under an embargo, not only from the United
Nations, which still applies, and from Iraq at the same time would so isolate
this landlocked community that they would effectively succumb. And instead,
they've thrived.

GROSS: You just got back from Kurdistan. I'm wondering about the reaction
you got as an American, or as an American woman.

Ms. WRIGHT: It was very refreshing being an American in the Middle East,
because this may be the only area of all of the Arab world or the Middle East
where Americans are really welcomed and adored. And the Kurdish leaders and
the Kurdish people all talk about waiting for the Americans to come in full
force.

GROSS: You also got back recently from Iran. Did you feel welcomed in Iran?

Ms. WRIGHT: Well, as an American, I think there is much more tension in a
place like Iran. I went, for example, on November 4th to the anniversary of
the takeover of the American Embassy 23 years ago. And people still get out
on the streets in front of the American Embassy compound and shout, `Death to
America,' that famous slogan from the takeover in 1979 when 52 Americans were
held for 444 days.

At the same time, there's been a recent poll in Iran that showed that over 65
percent of Iranians are ready to renew relations with the United States. The
poll was so contentious and controversial that the pollster was arrested and
is still in jail in Iran.

GROSS: My guest is Robin Wright, chief diplomatic correspondent of the Los
Angeles Times and author of the book "Sacred Rage: The Wrath of Militant
Islam." We'll talk more after a break. This is FRESH AIR.

(Soundbite of music)

GROSS: My guest is Robin Wright, chief diplomatic correspondent for the LA
Times. This month, she spent two weeks in northern Iraq and one week in Iran.
She observed the student protests in Iran calling for freedom of speech and
political reform. The specific focus has been the death sentence of a popular
history professor who was challenging the hard-line clergy and the
fundamentalist interpretation of Islam.

After we recorded our interview yesterday, several student leaders were
arrested and the government forbade further demonstrations defending the
professor. Wright told us today that she thinks the students will continue to
fight for reforms.

Ms. WRIGHT: The student movement in Iran today is emerging kind of as a third
force. Politics traditionally have been defined by the hard-line religious
clerics who have effective veto power over Iran's political system, and then
the reformists who emerged in 1997 with the election of President Khatami and
have since won elections in parliament as well as the municipal councils and
really are the strongest political force in Iran today, but don't have the
powers needed to put forth those reforms.

And the emergence of the students, who are reformers and want to see President
Khatami succeed, are beginning to break away and say that while they support
the reformers, they believe that after five years of inaction, it's time to
move on. And what makes them so interesting is unlike the demonstrations
three years ago, students are today not looking for confrontation. They're
engaged in peaceful civil disobedience. And their numbers, however, are so
large on almost every campus in Iran that they are engaging in what is the
biggest movement since the 1979 Revolution.

GROSS: One of the things that's so interesting about that is that it was
students who were so behind the revolution in 1979 that put fundamentalists in
power, and now it's students who are challenging fundamentalism.

Ms. WRIGHT: Iran's political story today is largely about demographics. The
vast majority of the population, something like two-thirds, is under 25; some
even say under 20. And they have no memory of the monarchy that prevailed in
Iran for 2,500 years and the protests and anger that led people to take to the
streets to oust it. Today, they are plugged into the Internet, they get
satellite television that brings in CNN, the BBC, as well as MTV and American
soap operas. And they understand what's happening in the rest of the world,
and they want very much to be a part of it.

GROSS: Did you speak to any of the students who were at the forefront of this
new movement?

Ms. WRIGHT: Well, it was very interesting because I went out on November 4th
with the students who had been bused in to demonstrate against the Americans,
and I interviewed some of the young people. And many of them were kind of
annoyed...

GROSS: This was the `Death to America' anniversary celebration?

Ms. WRIGHT: That's right.

GROSS: Yeah.

Ms. WRIGHT: And they were quite annoyed that they had been forced to come
down to the American Embassy. Again, they don't remember the takeover of the
embassy, and it's not an important historic moment in their eyes.

Then later, I went out to the student demonstrations, and this is where you
found the kids really engaged, talking about the issues. And it was quite
interesting to watch many of the professors also boycotting classes on the day
that the demonstration was on that particular campus. And as I said, it moved
around--but the students on campuses not only in the capital, Tehran, but at
more than a half-dozen major universities in other cities in Iran.

GROSS: Now this is happening at a time--you know, just a few months after
President Bush named Iran as part of the axis of evil. So I wonder if you
have a sense of how the students who were protesting the extremist cleric
leadership of Iran, how they feel about what Bush said about Iran.

Ms. WRIGHT: President Bush's speech in the State of the Union address calling
Iran one of three countries in the axis of evil I think backfired against the
United States inside Iran. This is a country where after the 9/11 attacks,
people took to the streets in candlelight vigils and there was an enormous
sympathy with the United States that some of the reformists actually thought
they could channel into reviving the overtures or the effort to renew
relations between the two countries.

Instead, this led to an enormous backlash among young people, as well as among
conservatives, and played into the hard-liners' argument that the United
States was still out to get the regime, that it was not possible to bridge the
deep chasm between the two countries.

GROSS: What's the place of religion in the lives of the students who are
protesting against the government and clerics?

Ms. WRIGHT: The role of religion in Iran today is really in a private
capacity. You've seen enormous transformation since the 1979 Revolution, when
people actively wore their religion on their sleeves, literally, in women's
dress and men's beards. It was a visible part of the culture.

Today, you see young men, the vast majority of whom are clean-shaven. They
are saying, in effect, there's not just one way; there are multiple ways to
lead a good Muslim's life. And that is, in many ways, the seed for democracy,
the kind of thinking that it's not one authoritative path to the
implementation of Islam.

I think what you're seeing, as well, is people saying, `We don't want a
counterrevolution.' Iranians don't have the energy or the interest in seeing
more bloodshed not only because of their own revolution, but also because of
its eight-year war with Iraq. What people are saying today is they want to
see the Islamic republic become more of a republic in which Islam is part of
an individual's private life.

GROSS: How were the students dressed who were protesting? I'm interested
particularly in the women students.

Ms. WRIGHT: Women's dress has really undergone a major transformation. I
remember in the early days of the revolution when I flew in and had very
light-pink nail polish on and that was banned. I had to put 10 Band-Aids on
my fingers to cover up the color I'd put on my nails even though it was barely
visible. Today, young students wear not only a lot of makeup, but bright-red
nail polish and they no longer even wear black stockings. You'll see girls in
sandals with bright-red toenails. And women wear very--the young women wear
very, very short kind of coats that--instead of the long shadores,
body-enveloping black shadores, or the total cover in scarves and baggy coats
that young students wore, you see them in blue jeans, high heels without black
stocking, very short, you know, jackets and their sleeves rolled up. So the
scarves on their heads are pushed back so you see a lot of hair. There is
much more of a gradual--it's a gradual transition, but women are wearing
things very differently than they did 20 years ago.

GROSS: Can you sense a big generation gap within families?

Ms. WRIGHT: The students today, or young people, are taking the lead in Iran
politically. And I think the interesting thing is that their parents in many
ways are following suit. There is a generation gap politically among those in
power and Iran's young people, but within families, I think you find a lot of
parents thinking that their kids are creating the kind of future they'd like
to see in Iran, too.

GROSS: Robin Wright is the chief diplomatic correspondent for the LA Times
and author of the book "Sacred Rage: The Wrath of Militant Islam." She'll be
back in the second half of the show.

I'm Terry Gross, and this is FRESH AIR.

(Announcements)

GROSS: Coming up, we continue our conversation with Robin Wright, chief
diplomatic correspondent for the LA Times.

Also, military expert Deborah Avant describes America's increasing reliance on
private military companies. And TV critic David Bianculli previews the new
season of "The Osbournes."

(Soundbite of music)

GROSS: This is FRESH AIR. I'm Terry Gross.

Let's get back to our interview with Robin Wright, chief diplomatic
correspondent for the LA Times and author of the book "Sacred Rage: The Wrath
of Militant Islam." Earlier this month, she spent two weeks in northern Iraq
and a week in Iran.

Having spent a week in Iran, what do you think Iran's position will be if we
do go to war with Iraq?

Ms. WRIGHT: I think the Iranians have concluded that this is something that
is going to happen. Saddam Hussein, one way or another, is going to be
removed from power. They're much more interested in the question of how it
happens and how long it takes, and, secondly, what comes next. There is, I
think, a willingness to play the same kind of role that Tehran did in the 1991
Gulf War and with Afghanistan--basically, standing on the sidelines, offering
to provide search and rescue services if American pilots are shot down--if the
war is short and conclusive. But if the war, or if a military operation
becomes prolonged, a lot of civilians are killed and it becomes messy in terms
of a conclusion, I suspect you will see the Iranians, like much of the Islamic
world, condemning the United States, being critical of its and suspicious of
its long-term intentions.

But I do know that the Americans have also sent through messages to the regime
to say, first, that the United States hopes to be there quite briefly and that
politically it hopes to move aside very soon after ousting Saddam Hussein, if
it comes to that because weapons inspections fail. And secondly, it hopes
that Iran will play the role it did in 1991 in standing aside.

GROSS: So do you think Iran will actually assist the United States if there's
war with Iraq?

Ms. WRIGHT: The important Iranian role really comes after the fall of Saddam
Hussein. Iran has supported one of the most active Shiite Muslim groups in
opposition to Saddam Hussein, the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution
in Iraq. And Iran has a very strong interest in seeing Shiite Muslims
represented in a new government because they make up the largest sector of
Iraqi society, probably 60 percent or more of the population. But ironically,
20 years after its own Islamic revolution, Iran wants very much to see a
stable regime in Baghdad that has no aggressive intentions against its
neighbors. And to do that, Iranians believe--and this is true of the
government--that the best solution is one that reflects all three sectors of
society and is not predominantly Shiite. And I think that's a turning point in
Iran politically.

GROSS: It's so interesting. You know, the United States backed Iraq in its
war against Iran. And now it looks like we're going to be going to war with
Iraq and we're hoping for some backing from Iran. Is that the kind of irony
you feel when you're traveling through that area?

Ms. WRIGHT: Yeah, but that's a complicated question. Iranians feel very
bitter about the United States' role in confronting Saddam Hussein in part
because they so wanted American help against Saddam's invasion after 1980.
They point out that Iran suffered the highest loss of victims to chemical
weapons. According to the CIA, at least 50,000 Iranians died from Iraq's use
of chemical weapons, particularly mustard gas. And I toured many of the
hospitals where these people are still dying.

And over the last five years, Iran has discovered a second wave of
victims--people who had low-dose exposure and had no idea that they had come
into contact--and now they have begun to die. And a pulmonary specialist said
that medical teams now dealing with this believe they may have only reached
the tip of the iceberg--that there may be thousands more who show up now and
years down the road, and that it's also created a real problem with birth
defects among a second generation--children of those who came into contact
with chemical weapons in the 1980s.

And Iranians point out that this was--that Iraq's most frequent usage of
chemical weapons was after the United States became involved in helping Saddam
Hussein with satellite intelligence, pointing out where Iranian troops were,
and then Saddam Hussein used chemical weapons against them. And so the
Iranians feel that the United States has some culpability in the deaths of its
people by chemical weapons, and now, of course, is going into Iraq because of
the same issue.

GROSS: What are some of the long-term health effects that you saw now in
Iran--results of the chemical weapons attacks?

Ms. WRIGHT: A death by chemical weapon is one of the grisliest deaths.
People I saw look like concentration camp visitors, you know, with toothpick
bones and skin tightly wrapped around it. People with severe respiratory
problems--gasping for breath. Many of them recalled only the smell of roses
or garlic or freshly mown lawn, which are the telltale signs of mustard gas.
Some of them have memories that are equivalent to an early Alzheimer's
patient. They have blisters and deep scarring of their skin, particularly
around areas that perspire, under the arms and elsewhere. And the skin is
deeply discolored and blistered. It's--teeth fall out so that people have to
eat with only their gums, if they can eat at all. Weight loss. I interviewed
one fellow who is 33 years old and he dropped more than half of his weight.
Today he only weighs 107 pounds. The doctor said he probably had less than
six months. I interviewed some people who probably are not alive now because
death was so imminent.

GROSS: Having witnessed the terrible long-term effects of the chemical
weapons, long-term effects on those lucky enough to have survived this long
after the attacks, would it affect your willingness to go to the area and
cover a war if there is a war with Iraq?

Ms. WRIGHT: Well, it certainly makes you think twice. And it's one of the
reasons the Kurds have asked of the United States gas masks and medical
facilities to deal with chemical weapons if Saddam Hussein should use them
again against the Kurds. I do know that many of the correspondents who were
going to that area are taking training in nuclear, biological and chemical
fallout and taking gas masks and special medical supplies with them. This in
many ways could be the most dangerous war for journalists as well as troops
because of the issue of weapons of mass destruction.

GROSS: Well, I want to thank you so much for talking with us.

Ms. WRIGHT: Thank you.

GROSS: Robin Wright is the chief diplomatic correspondent for the Los Angeles
Times.

Coming up, how our government is turning to private military companies to
supplement the US military. This is FRESH AIR.

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

Interview: Deborah Avant discusses the privatization of security
and military services
TERRY GROSS, host:

The US government has been supplementing the military by contracting with
private military companies. This is in part a response to the downsizing of
the military after the Cold War and the increasing number of small conflicts
and humanitarian missions that America has been dealing with. My guest
Deborah Avant has written extensively about this new trend. She's an
associate professor of political science and international affairs at
Georgetown University, where she teaches international security. I asked her
to describe some of the functions that the private military companies are
serving in helping America fight the war against terrorism and prepare for the
possibility of war with Iraq.

Professor DEBORAH AVANT (George Washington University): In the war on
terrorism, private companies are already providing many kinds of services in
terms of logistical support for American forces in the field in Afghanistan.
It's also anticipated that these companies will be doing things like training
the Afghan army, which is something that will be a long-term process and
something that the American military at some point in time will probably want
to give up to private contractors. Certainly if we go into Iraq, some kind of
postwar settlement will require some kind of military training for the Iraqi
military. And I would imagine that private contractors could do something
like that.

Now private contractors also will probably play a significant role in
operational support in a war with Iraq and, indeed, were instrumental in
providing operational support for some of the weapons systems that were used
in the war against Afghanistan.

GROSS: So why does the American military subcontract to these private
companies for certain military services?

Prof. AVANT: Over the course of the 1990s as our military shrank and the
number of operations that it was involved in didn't shrink, it became more
important in some senses to find additional people to do certain things and to
save the active duty military for other kinds of things. And so in a sense
why we're privatizing these tasks now have to do with our ideas about what the
appropriate size for our military is, and the fact that we aren't thinking
about increasing that dramatically. And we've gotten used to privatizing
these tasks. But it is a little ironic because in many cases it's actually
costing us additional money rather than saving us money.

GROSS: So what's the difference between private military companies and
mercenaries?

Prof. AVANT: Well, that's another good question. Nobody can quite define in
an agreeable way what a mercenary is. You know, one of the differences
between mercenaries in the past is that these private companies aren't part of
anybody's forces, so we aren't hiring, you know, forces from other countries.
So that's different from one kind of mercenary. More recently, mercenaries
have, of course, been associated with, you know, the dogs of war--these
private, free-lance guys that would do almost anything for money. And these
private companies are different from that in the sense that they have a
reputation that they want to preserve. They would like a long-term market
share. They want to participate in a legitimate function, which is providing
military services. And they try to do things in such a way as to preserve
their potential for future market shares, which some have argued have made
them more apt to behave in a way that we would think of as legitimate
internationally.

GROSS: What do you mean by market shares in this context?

Prof. AVANT: Well, these companies are looking at the future. They've
estimated what kinds of demand there is going to be. And they want to be able
to sell to entities that can afford to buy their services. Now in the 1990s,
a lot of the entities that could afford to buy their services were countries
like the United States, organizations like the United Nations,
organizations--NGOs around the world, private companies--diamond miners, oil
companies, timber companies that were operating in unstable parts of the
world--and many of these entities were interested in behaving legitimately.
And, in fact, there's been, you know, quite a push in the private sector to
come up with standards by which private companies could hold themselves
accountable, if you will, to the international community and say, `We're not
making conflict worse. We may be operating in conflict zones, but we're still
operating according to certain standards of behavior.' And these private
military companies and private security companies have been anxious to sort of
catch that wave and pay attention to certain kinds of standards.

GROSS: Are the members of private military companies allowed to actually use
weapons in a combat situation? I know they can train soldiers to use weapons,
but can they use them themselves?

Prof. AVANT: Some of them have. You know, again this sort of depends on the
company and where they're aiming. Some of the US companies, Military
Professional Resources Incorporated, or MPRI, which is a very high-level
company which has trained militaries in the Balkans, in Latin America and in
Africa, has a restriction that it has imposed on its employees against
carrying firearms. Other companies--ICI Oregon, Dyne Corp--don't have those
kind of restrictions, and their employees have, in fact, carried weapons.
Some South African companies--particularly in the mid-'90s there was an
infamous company called Executive Outcomes, that, you know, basically led
offensives against the RUF in Sierra Leone, and certainly carried and fired
weapons.

GROSS: So a lot of these private military companies make their money by
selling their services to, for instance, the US military. Do they ever give
their services to high-paying dictators and tyrants who can afford, you know,
to pay them handsomely but will be using these services to help oppress the
dictator's own people?

Prof. AVANT: Yeah, that's the $64,000 question that a lot of people are
trying to answer. Now, of course, private military companies have sold
services to dictators. For instance, Tudjman's government in Croatia was
certainly a government that we often associate with dictatorship, and MPRI did
sell services to Tudjman's government. The rationale was that MPRI was
selling Tudjman's government services that were information about appropriate
civil-military relations, how to organize their defense department and things
that might push that government closer to democratic reforms. There isn't a
lot of good information that links any particular kinds of military training
programs like that to democratic reforms in given countries. What American
companies have not done is contract with dictators that the US government
wasn't supporting in one way or another.

Now whether they would do that in the future--you know, it's hard to say for
sure. One thing is that the US is such a good customer that many companies
that do sell their services to the United States government wouldn't want to
jeopardize that good customer in order to take advantage of perhaps a more
fly-by-night customer in the Third World somewhere.

GROSS: What kind of power does the American government have to regulate these
private military companies?

Prof. AVANT: Well, the US actually has a fairly clear system of regulation.
And now we're talking about contracts between these companies and a foreign
government. In the United States, there is a regulation called International
Transfer of Arms Regulation, that actually had a clause in it to regulate
services. This originally was intended to regulate the kinds of services that
might go along with, you know, selling guns or certain kinds of weapons
systems to other countries. But it's been used very effectively to regulate
these new kinds of services. And so these companies must be registered with
the US government and they must apply for a license from the US State
Department in order to export these services abroad. And there's a licensing
process that goes on in the State Department where, you know, people that are
knowledgeable about the region and the country that these companies would be
exporting to would be involved in the process. And then a license would be
granted or not for the export of this kind of service.

GROSS: These private military companies have generated some controversy. Why
are they controversial?

Prof. AVANT: Well, first of all, because they are selling military services
for profit. And there's a lot of concern that somehow or another the profit
motive is going to be the important motive in determining their actions. And,
you know, some people think about this in a very crass way; you know, that
these companies could simply sell their services to the highest bidder. But
other people have thought about it in more nuanced ways, having to do with the
fact that these private companies change the process by which policy is made.

And, in fact, if you look at what happens when private services are available,
the US government has a different tool available, and this tool is one that
tends to give more power to executive branch agencies and less power and
information to Congress. And, you know, some people have suggested it also
creates less possibility for transparency to the public about what the United
States is doing in its foreign affairs.

And, of course, they also--they're made up of some pretty high-level military
officers who have a lot of connections in government, and to the degree that
they're motivated by the profits of their firm, they can use those connections
in order to sort of influence the way American foreign policy is developed.
Now, of course, that happens all the time in a lot of different areas. But
when we're talking about foreign policy, and particularly security policy, it
just raises some red flags.

GROSS: Do you have any idea how many people are in America are employed by
private military companies?

Prof. AVANT: That's a really hard question to answer because these companies
operate as a small full-time contingent and a very large database. For
instance, MPRI suggests that it has 12,000 people in its database. Now the
problem is that, you know, maybe 10,000 of those people are on databases of
other companies as well. And so it's really hard to know how many people are
actually working for these companies because somebody working for MPRI one
week could be working, you know, by themselves free-lancing or could be
working for another company the next week.

GROSS: Has the UN discussed private military companies?

Prof. AVANT: They have. There is a UN special officer on the regulation and
control of mercenaries. And the UN has discussed back and forth for quite a
few years the degree to which they should focus on trying to outlaw the kinds
of activities these companies perform that sort of bleed into the mercenary
area, or the degree to which they should try to regulate the activities of
more legitimate companies. And the conversation is a little bit stalled. At
this point, there is no UN regulation of these kinds of companies.

GROSS: Well, I want to thank you very much for talking with us.

Prof. AVANT: Thank you.

GROSS: Deborah Avant is an associate professor of political science and
international affairs at George Washington University.

Coming up, TV critic David Bianculli on the new season of "The Osbournes."
This is FRESH AIR.

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

Review: New season of "The Osbournes"
TERRY GROSS, host:

The pop culture phenomenon known as "The Osbournes" returns on MTV tonight
with the start of its second season. This time viewers are in on the joke and
won't be caught by surprise, but TV critic David Bianculli says that doesn't
make it unsuccessful.

DAVID BIANCULLI reporting:

I'm surprised I like the second season of "The Osbournes" as much as I do.
Then again, I was surprised when I liked the first season, too. We've got a
lot to blame "The Osbournes" for, starting with such copycat successors as the
E! cable network's "The Anna Nicole Show," which may be one of the worst
television shows ever made. No, that's not fair. It is one of the worst
shows ever made. No reason to hedge.

"The Osbournes" worked as a reality show the first time around because the
family was so weird yet beneath it all so normal. OK, so Ozzy wasn't like
most dads, because most dads didn't go on tour to headline Ozzfest or have to
live down past stories of biting heads off birds or rodents. But at home, the
fun was in watching Ozzy not be able to work the remote on his high-tech TV or
catch the escaped pets or deal with the constant bickering between son Jack
and daughter Kelly. Sharon Osbourne, Ozzy's wife, was the calm center of this
storm, seeming to enjoy every minute of it.

The Osbournes are like real-life Simpsons. Beneath all the craziness, all the
screaming and posturing, and all the antics is a family whose members love one
another. The second season brings a lot of change to "The Osbournes," but it
doesn't change that. One of the biggest changes is that the Osbournes
themselves have become A-list celebrities rather than fringe oddities. In
tonight's opening episode, we see Ozzy attending the White House
Correspondents dinner as a special guest and getting singled out by President
Bush during his speech at the podium. We also see Kelly preparing to make her
singing debut on the MTV Video Music Awards, performing a version of the
Madonna hit, "Papa Don't Preach."

But what makes the sequences work is the humanity beneath them. When Ozzy
hears his name mentioned by the president of the United States, he doesn't sit
there the image of rock star cool; he jumps up and pumps his fists in the air,
like a field goal kicker who's just won the Super Bowl. And after Kelly sings
on national TV, she and Jack and their mom return home in a limo, drained by
the whole experience. Mom sits in the center of the backseat with a child's
head resting on each shoulder. It's not a posed or forced shot. It's just
the way they are. And so is the sudden, honest and very funny way Jack
suddenly jumps to attention inside the limo when the car passes a McDonald's.

(Soundbite of "The Osbournes")

JACK OSBOURNE: (Breathes in deeply) McRib is back. I'm so excited.

KELLY OSBOURNE: Are you serious, Jack?

J. OSBOURNE: They are so good.

K. OSBOURNE: You're getting excited over the McRib?

J. OSBOURNE: You know what, Kelly? It's the little things that count.

K. OSBOURNE: Jack goes, (breathes in deeply) `McRib is back.'

J. OSBOURNE: Shut up.

Mrs. SHARON OSBOURNE: I know.

J. OSBOURNE: You know, I...

K. OSBOURNE: You're such a twerp, Jack. The McRib.

J. OSBOURNE: (Censored), you. (Censored) you and your little singing
thingie.

K. OSBOURNE: Right, Jack.

J. OSBOURNE: Just because I'm really, really, really good-looking, you're
jealous.

K. OSBOURNE: And you're excited about the McRib.

J. OSBOURNE: Yeah.

K. OSBOURNE: (Breathes in deeply) `McRib is back.'

J. OSBOURNE: You wish you could get as excited over little things like that.

BIANCULLI: In this case, Kelly's right. Getting excited by the McRib is
something that's worth getting McRibbed about. But there's something real
about their exchange, even though the camera is there. Just as in next week's
episode there's something very real about Sharon's learning she has colon
cancer. Think of that. A reality show where actual reality intrudes.

MTV nervously insists Sharon's cancer will not change the tone of the series,
as though changing the tone under the circumstances would be a bad thing. But
already, the lesson sent forth by the Osbournes is a pro-family one, and a lot
less rebellious than most of what's shown on MTV.

Ozzy is so dedicated to his wife Sharon and so tolerant of his kids that I
like to think of him as a rock 'n' roll Gomez Addams and her as Morticia. She
doesn't even need to speak French to drive him crazy. There's love mixed in
with all this lunacy, and that's why I think this second season of "The
Osbournes," at least the two episodes that I've seen, are just as entertaining
as the first.

GROSS: David Bianculli is TV critic for the New York Daily News.

(Soundbite of "Crazy Train")

Mr. OZZY OSBOURNE: All aboard. Ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha. I, I, I, I, I.

(Credits)

GROSS: I'm Terry Gross.

(Soundbite of "Crazy Train")

Mr. OSBOURNE: (Singing) Crazy, but that's how it goes. Millions of people
living as fools. Maybe it's not too late to learn how to love and forget how
to hate. Mental wounds not healing. Life's a bitter shame. I'm going off
the rails on a crazy train. I'm going off the rails on a crazy train.
Transcripts are created on a rush deadline, and accuracy and availability may vary. This text may not be in its final form and may be updated or revised in the future. Please be aware that the authoritative record of Fresh Air interviews and reviews are the audio recordings of each segment.